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Abstract
With terrorist security of critical assets becoming a vital aspect of railway systems, this paper reviews the existing international 
policy frameworks and also risk assessment methodologies. This information fed into development of a risk assessment 
methodology (RAMPART Methodology) specifically addressing metro and light rail systems (mass transit).  The uniqueness lies 
in differentiating itself using the following nine factors and parameters: qualitative vs quantitative approach; detail (depth of 
data/information levels disaggregation); scope (e.g. what threats/assets/sector covered?); what is target user group (legislators, 
management, technocrats, etc); definition of asset criticality; degree of subjectivity in whole RA process; is resilience 
(countermeasures) included?; are interdependences included; and common taxonomy/terminology. 
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Security is of growing concern in the EU.  The cost of security could be high. That is why security investments need to 
be correlated to a set of identified risks, which can be defined as the product of the likelihood and the impact of specific 
threats. Installation of security technologies, more security staff and accompanying personal training that must be done in 
order to protect the passengers, staff and assets. A comprehensive risk assessment provides a good potential to strike the 
desired balance between costs and effectiveness. The term “threats” in security applies to a wide array of unlawful 
activities, from low and medium crimes such as graffiti, aggression or theft to major attacks such as bombings or arson. 
Inevitably, there exist many risk assessment methodologies (RAMs) across the world for different applications. These 
are usually tested and validated for the purpose - for a sector, organisation, asset or threat or indeed a particular audience 
(policy makers, decision makers or operators). The RAMPART methodology focusses on the threat of terrorist attacks on 
assets related to metro and light rail. The following approach is applied within this research work to develop risk 
assessment specifications that address metro and light rail applications: 
x Review of European and international critical assets protection policy frameworks
x Literature review of risk assessment methodologies relevant to metro/ light rail transportation.
x Development of RAMPART tool risk assessment specifications 
x Development of an asset inventory and determination of critical assets
1.2. Research Objectives and Scope
Threat and risk assessments are considered as an analytical approach needed for the prioritisation of resources in 
the security sector, with the final goal of reducing/mitigating terrorist risks. There is currently an increasing interest 
in the use of risk management techniques for assessing vulnerability of CIs to a terrorist hazard. As such, the various 
uncertainties and risks associated with terrorism must be quantified and then used as the basis for assessing the 
viability and relative benefits of different mitigation measures. To date many different risk assessment 
methodologies have been developed to be implemented for specific applications and scenarios, from infrastructure 
to information technology to business management. 
As far as blast-related threats are concerned, most of state-of-the-art risk management methodologies are focused 
only on the structural resistance of the assets, rather than on a complete assessment approach (Ingleton and O’Neill, 
2011). A probabilistic approach is sometimes applied to predict risks of damage arising from blast damage to built-
infrastructure, keeping into account the properties of the materials involved. The same applies to software tools used 
against blast threats. There is therefore the need for a risk management methodology and tool to mitigate blast 
terrorist threats, based on a global and holistic approach, since nowadays none of these are available on the market 
for the involved stakeholders. This was the motivation for developing the RAMPART risk assessment methodology. 
The objectives of this research are as follows:
x Appraisal and evaluation of the methodologies and processes in developing risk assessment strategies.
x Identification of strengths and weaknesses of relevant state-of-the-art risk assessment methodologies.
x Development of specifications for RAM for terrorist attacks on metro and light rail systems. 
2. Risk Management
2.1. Fundamentals
The risk assessment helps identify the security gaps, supports the security operation planning and management 
and helps draw up the adequate preventive actions and countermeasures. In the overall context of risk management, 
the objective of performing risk assessments is to identify and estimate levels of exposure to the likelihood of loss, 
so that managers can make informed decisions on how to manage those risks of loss – either by accepting each risk, 
or by mitigating it – through investing in appropriate internal protective measures judged sufficient to lower the 
potential loss to an acceptable level, or by investing in external indemnity (The Open Group, 2009). Risk assessment 
takes account of the probability of a threat happening – this is the main difference with a general impact assessment.
The risk management process shown in Fig. 1 is made up of five main pillars (Soehchen and Barcanescu, 2014):
x Establishing the context and defining levels of details for the risk assessment
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x Identification of Risks
x Analysis of Risks
x Evaluation of Risks
x Treatment of Risks 
The three middle pillars constitute risk assessment. The main rationale behind performing and applying a risk 
assessment is to spot the relevant security gaps, in order to decide what measures may be appropriate in order to 
improve the overall security level.
Fig. 1. Risk Management Process (Soehchen and Barcanescu, 2014).
According to (Soehchen and Barcanescu, 2014) the three risk assessment stages involve the following: 
x Risk Identification: Precisely identify the potential threats and their connected risk scenarios that can have an 
impact on the metro system.
x Risk Analysis: It is the moment when experts from different backgrounds – operations, security department, 
technical departments and others, but also external stakeholders, especially police and law enforcement 
agencies – will analyse and assess the risks and risk scenarios. 
x Risk evaluation: risk analysis results are obtained and analysed. Based on the findings, the risk assessment team 
can thus define the threats and/or the risk scenarios which need to be assessed in more detail usually applying the 
ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable/Possible) principle. 
x Risk mitigation: The final step of the risk assessment procedure is the risk mitigation. 
Any risk assessment should undergo a review and monitoring process. Generally however, most RAMs follow a 
linear approach of as shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Sequence of risk assessment.
The second important parameter that enters the stage for the risk assessment methodologies of networked 
infrastructures is the element of interdependencies. According to the work of Rinaldi et al (2001) four types of 
interdependencies are identified for critical infrastructures:
x Physical: The operation of one infrastructure depends on the material output of the other. 
x Cyber: Dependency on information transmitted through the information infrastructure. 
x Geographic: Dependency on local environmental effects that affects simultaneously several infrastructures. 
x Logical: Any kind of dependency not characterised as Physical, Cyber or Geographic.
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) risk assessment methodologies can be divided in two major categories: 
x Sectoral methodologies, when each sector is treated separately with its own risks
x Ranking and systems approach that assess the critical infrastructures as an interconnected network.
Methodologies that have been initially conceptualised to fit in the second category are rather limited. The vast 
majority of the existing work has been sectoral and mostly at asset level (Giannopoulos et al, 2012). The majority of 
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this approaches resort to the theory of resilience (Hollnagel et al, 2006; Sterbenz et al, 2010) and the emerging 
behaviour (Woltjer, 2010).
2.2. Risk Taxonomy 
The Open Group (2009) observes that one of the major problems with risk management is that a variety of 
definitions do exist, but the risk management community has not yet adopted a consistent definition for even the 
most fundamental terms in its vocabulary; e.g., threat, vulnerability, even risk itself. To deal with this, they 
developed a standard that provides a single logical and rational taxonomical framework for anyone who needs to 
understand and/or analyse information security risk. This, however, was in the context of software threats. Coherent 
Risk Taxonomy is an essential step towards enabling all stakeholders in risk management to use key risk 
management terms – with precise meanings so that there is a bridge for the language gap between risk assessors, 
security wings, business managers, lawyers, politicians, and other professionals, in all sectors of industry and 
commerce and the critical infrastructure, whose responsibilities depend on managing risk.
3. Policy Frameworks
Terrorism mainly targets ‘western countries’.  Therefore explained below are CIPs for the EU, USA and Canada 
which provide a good representation of western countries. At a high national level, policy drives risk management 
that is applied at sector or company levels. 
3.1. European Union (EU)
The European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) is a multi-annual programme that 
encompasses several instruments for the protection of critical infrastructures in Europe. The legislative instrument is 
the Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the 
assessment of the need to improve their protection (EC, 2008). Due to the interrelationship between sectors and 
infrastructure, a systems approach was recommended for critical infrastructure under the EPCIP Directive 
(Giannopoulos et al, 2012).
3.2. USA
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7) established U.S. policy for enhancing critical 
infrastructure protection by establishing a framework for the Department’s partners to identify, prioritise, and 
protect the critical infrastructure in their communities from terrorist attacks (US Government, 2014). The directive 
identified 17 critical infrastructure sectors and, for each sector, designated a federal Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) 
to lead protection and resilience-building programmes and activities. HSPD-7 allows for the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to identify gaps in existing critical infrastructure sectors and establish new sectors to fill 
these gaps. 
3.3. Canada
The National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Canadian Government, 2014) sets the framework for 
strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure in Canada. It gives emphasis to the resilience aspect of critical 
infrastructures as the ultimate goal to be achieved. A sectoral approach is used. However, interdependencies are 
taken into account. Resilience is not directly tackled at this level but it is part of the national strategy for CIP.
4. Past EU Projects
Six past EU projects have been identified as being relevant to the objectives of the RAMAPRT project. They 
listed in Table 1:
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Table 1. Past EU Projects Relevant to Risk Assessment s for Terrorist Attacks.
EU Project Duration Objectives Was RAM developed?
Does the 
RAM resolve 
Metro and 
Light Rail
Was 
software 
tool 
developed?
Was resilience 
included Website
SECUR-ED 
Apr 2011 
- Sept 
2014 
(3.5yrs)      
Demonstration project  
provide a set of counter-
measure tools to improve 
urban transport security
Yes
No
(only partly, 
countermeasu
res)
No (only a 
framework)
Yes 
(demonstration 
of counter 
measures)
http://www.secu
r-
ed.eu/?page_id=
10
SECURE-
STATION 
Jun 2011 
- May 
2014 
(3yrs)
Development of a design 
guidance to address the 
risk of terrorist attacks in 
railway stations 
Yes
No
(party, only 
buildings)
Yes
Yes
(Secure by 
Design)
http://www.secu
restation.eu/
SECURE-
METRO 
Jan 2010 
- Dec 
2012 (3 
yrs)
Develop validated 
materials selection & 
structural design strategies 
for building metro vehicles 
with resilience to explosive 
& firebomb attacks.
No
(applied 
adaptation 
of existing 
FAIR tool)
N/A
(Developed 
KPIs specific 
to metro 
vehicles)
No Yes
http://securemet
ro.inrets.fr/
EURACOM 
Jul 2009 
– Mar 
2011 
(2yrs)
Identify, together with 
European Critical Energy 
Infrastructures operators, a 
common and holistic 
approach (end-to-end 
energy supply chain) for 
risk assessment and risk 
management solutions.
Yes
No
(wide and 
applied at 
high CI and 
country level)
No
No
(covers energy 
supply chain)
http://www.eos-
eu.com/?Page=e
uracom
RACAM 
Feb 2009 
– Jan 
2011 
(2yrs)
Develop a risk assessment 
framework & counter-
measure auditing 
methodology to assess & 
mitigate vulnerabilities of 
metro systems against 
potential terrorist attacks.
Yes
(a 
framework)
No No
Yes
(counter 
measure 
auditing 
methodology, 
not counter 
measures)
http://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/home-
affairs/financing
/fundings/projec
ts/stories/racam
_en.htm
COUNTER-
ACT 
Jun 2006 
– Oct 
2009 
(3yrs)
Development of a risk 
methodology for transport 
and energy sectors against 
terrorist threats
Yes No No
Yes (best 
practice 
countermeasure
s considered)
http://www.tran
sport-
research.info/w
eb/projects/proj
ect_details.cfm?
id=36152
5. Risk Assessment Methodologies (RAMs)
5.1. Review of EU and International Risk Assessment Methodologies 
As a starting point, a review of EU and international RA methodologies was conducted, most of which were 
reviewed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (Giannopoulos et al, 2012). See Table 2.
5.2. Commonalities and Differences between Risk Assessment Methodologies 
Review of the risk methodologies presented indicates that there are more differences than commonalities. The 
main commonality is that most apply a linear approach to risk assessment where threats to assets (or targets) are 
identified following by evaluation of how much the asset is vulnerable to the threat. Finally, the consequence (or 
impact) of a successful attack is determined (seeFigure 2).
Although some methodologies were similar in some aspects, overall, they do not all agree on the following:
x Qualitative vs quantitative approach
x Detail (depth of data/information levels disaggregation)
x Scope (e.g. what threats/assets/sector covered?)
x What is target user group (legislators, management, technocrats, etc)
x Definition of asset criticality (physical assets, economical, operations, lives, etc).
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x Degree of (human) subjectivity in whole RA process
x Is resilience included?  (are countermeasures integrated)
x Are interdependences included (system or sectoral)?
x Common taxonomy/terminology
The differences do not necessarily represent a fundamental disagreement between the methodologies. However, 
they mostly indicate their specificities of areas of applications. For the RAMPART Project, these differences, also 
present an opportunity for differentiating itself for application in metro and light rail applications, with flexibility to 
cover other rail segments.
Table 2. Risk Assessment Methodologies.
Country/Region Risk Assessment Methodologies 
USA
x Better Infrastructure Risk and Resilience (BIRR) – USA
x Protection of Critical Infrastructures - Baseline Protection Concept (BMI) – USA
x CARVER2 – USA
x Critical Infrastructure Modelling Simulation (CIMS) – USA
x Critical Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System (CIPDSS) – USA
x CommAspen – USA
x Fast Analysis Infrastructure Tool (FAIT) – US
x Multilayer Infrastructure Network (MIN) – US
x Modular Dynamic Model – US
x Agent-Based Laboratory for Economics (N-ABLE) – US
x Net-Centric Effects-based operations MOdel (NEMO) - US 
x Network Security Risk Assessment modelling (NSRAM) – US
x RAMCAP-Plus - US
x Sandia Risk Assessment Methodology – US
x RAND Corporation – US
x Factor Analysis of and Information Risk (FAIR) – US (Not in JRC)
Australia x Critical Infrastructure Protection modelling and Analysis (CIPMA)
European Union
x European Risk Assessment and Contingency Planning Methodologies for Interconnected Energy Networks 
(EURACOM) – EU
x Cluster Of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Anti-terrorist ACTivities (COUNTERACT) –EU
x SECUR-ED Risk Management Methodology – EU
Norway x DECRIS – Norway
Denmark x Risk and Vulnerability analysis (RVA ) - Denmark 
5.3. Characteristics of a Complete Risk Assessment Methodology
Recognising that risk assessment is made up of three main components: Threats, Vulnerability and Impact, an effective 
RAM should be able to quantify and/or qualify all these. In order to be consistently effective in making these decisions, 
there is need to be able to compare the issues themselves, as well as the options and solutions that are available. In order to 
compare, there is need to measure, and measurement is predicated upon a solid definition of the things to be measured. All 
risk assessment approaches should include (The Open Group, 2009): 
x An effort to clearly identify and characterise the assets, threats, controls, and impact/loss elements at play within the 
risk scenario being assessed. 
x An understanding of the organisational context for the analysis (what is at stake?).
x Measurement and/or estimation of the various risk factors. 
x Calculation of risk. 
x Communication of the risk results to decision-makers in a form that is meaningful and useful. 
Where a computer too is developed for a risk assessment methodology, the following aspects need to be considered: 
Complexity of the Model; Availability of Data; Iterative Risk Analyses; and Perspective.
6. Development of RAMPART Risk Assessment Specifications
6.1. Risk Assessment Requirements - Approach
The main output of RAMPART is a risk assessment methodology specific to metro and light rail undertakings, which 
are at risk of terrorist attacks. Recognising that there exist many RA methodologies, an analysis of current methodologies 
relevant to CIPs was conducted. Beneficial aspects of these were incorporated in the RAMPART Risk Assessment 
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Methodology (see Figure 3). Inevitably there may be deficiencies between the project requirements and those of existing 
methodologies. RAMPART will find solutions to these deficiencies to become inputs to the new methodology.
Fig. 3. Flow chart for developing the RAMPART RA methodology.
6.2. Selected RAMs for Detailed Review
As part of this research, over twenty risk assessment methodologies shown in Section 0 were considered (Matsika and 
O’Neill, 2015a). During an expert project meeting six methodologies were selected for detailed analysis. Selection was 
done based on the following: Scope; Sector; Treatment of qualitative vs quantitative approach; Taxonomy applied; and 
Relevance to metro and light rail applications. They were analysed to identify their strengths and weaknesses (see 
Table 3). 
x SEST-RAM: Developed through the EC SECURESTATION project (Soehchen and Barcanescu, 2014).
x RAMCAP Plus: An all hazards/all infrastructures resilience oriented RAM, focusing on decreasing vulnerability by 
realisation of critical threats and scenarios, and increasing system’s resilience (ASME-ITI, 2009). 
x NSRAM: The focus of the Network Security Risk Assessment modelling (NSRAM) methodology is to determine the 
interconnected system response to different types of incidents and accidents (IIIA, 2015).
x FAIR: Factor Analysis of IT & Information Risk (FAIR) is a framework for creating and maintaining a threat-
modelled information risk framework (Optical Risk, 2014).
x FAIT: This tool was developed in the US by the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Centre to support 
DHS by determining the significance and the interdependencies of US critical infrastructures (Kelic et al, 2008). 
x RAND Methodology: Scenario based qualitative RA cost effective evaluation. The scope of the work is railway sector 
and terrorist threats. The main strength of this methodology is the level of detail (88 different attack scenarios) that the 
model analyses (Ortiz et al, 2008).
Beneficial Aspects drawn from these RAs were:
1. Optimises the scope by avoiding unnecessary details and focusing on the most critical assets of a system (RAMCAP 
Plus)
2. Interdependencies – covering interconnected infrastructures with the objective is to determine how the systems 
respond and interact to various kinds of accidents and attacks (NSRAM, FAIT)
3. Probabilistic risk assessment (NSRAM, FAIR)
4. Quantification, less qualification (FAIR, RAMCAP Plus)
5. Asset Characterisation (identification) (FAIR, RAMCAP Plus)
6. Cost Benefit Analysis of countermeasures (NSRAM, RAND)
7. Cost based on asset valuation – monetary value (FAIR)
8. Targeted at CI operators and decision makers (RAMCAP Plus, NSRAM)
9. High visualisation capability (FAIT)
10. Scenario based (RAND)
11. Design for resilience (SEST-RAM)
12. Integrates evacuation (SEST-RAM)
RAMPART (additional or enhanced characteristics):
1. Combined effects that include loss of property and life.
2. Incorporates countermeasures/resilience
3. Highly abstracted
4. Cost benefit analysis 
5. Detailed inventory of metro and light rail key assets
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6. Threats: explosives  IED/VBIED, CBRN, sabotage, cyber-attacks, Armmed attack , unarmed attack
7. Customised to metro and light rail applications 
8. Is highly parametrised and leans more towards quantitative analysis as opposed to qualitative 
9. Flexibility: Minimises subjectivity
10. Impact: casualties, injuries, out of hour service, physical damage
Table 3. Risk Assessment Methodologies Beneficial Aspects RAMPART Specifications.
RAM Tool Developer Objectives Scope
Level of 
Abstraction
Target Group
Is resilience 
(counter-
measures) 
incorporated?
Remarks
SEST-RAM EC Project 
SECURESTATION 
measures risk in 
relative rather than 
absolute terms
Design of rail 
stations for 
terrorist attack 
resilience
Medium Technocrats 
and decision 
makers
Yes (with cost 
benefit)
Includes 
rapid 
evacuation
RAMCAP-
Plus
American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) (USA)
all hazards risk and 
resilience 
assessment 
methodology
all hazards/all 
infrastructures
Low (high-
level 
approach)
CI operators 
and decision 
makers
Yes
Fast Analysis 
Infrastructure 
Tool (FAIT)
National 
Infrastructure 
Simulation and 
Analysis Centre 
(USA)
determining the 
significance and 
inter-dependencies 
of US critical 
infrastructures
All
infrastructure 
high Policy makers 
and decision 
makers No
Impact 
assessment 
tool, not 
RA tool
Network 
Security Risk 
Assessment 
modelling 
(NSRAM)
Institute for 
Infrastructure and 
Information 
Assurance at James 
Madison University 
(USA
determine the 
interconnected 
system response to 
different types of 
incidents and 
accidents
flow-based 
analysis
Medium Decision 
makers
Yes (with Cost 
benefit analysis)
Factor 
Analysis of 
Information 
Risk (FAIR)
Risk Management 
Insight LLC, USA
creating and 
maintaining a 
threat-modelled 
information risk
framework
IT/software High IT practitioners 
and
Decision 
makers
Yes
RAND 
Methodology
RAND Corporation Scenario based 
qualitative RA cost 
effective evaluation
Railway sector 
and terrorist 
threats
High Decision 
makers
Yes
Does not 
consider 
the 
additional 
scenarios
6.3. RAMPART Risk Assessment Methodology Specifications
As mentioned before, the RAMPART project has specific requirements or specifications aimed at addressing unique 
goals identified to address risk of terrorist attacks on metros and light rail. Key issues to consider include: Effectiveness of 
the methodology and any interdependencies among sectors or systems to be considered. Resilience is usually not included 
in the risk assessments review, although some RAs implicitly incorporate it. 
7. RAMPART Risk Assessment Methodology 
By applying the approach depicted in (see Figure 3), key factors that constitute a robust RAM were identified. This led 
to development of RAMPART specifications as described below:
7.1. Qualitative vs Quantitative Approach 
According to the outcomes of the SECUR-ED project, a risk assessment in the public transport security should be done 
in a qualitative way. A quantitative assessment based on mathematical formulas and calculations is not possible due to 
a lack of statistics (especially concerning terrorist incidents) (Soehchen and Barcanescu, 2014). However, with projects 
such as SECUREMETRO, SECURESTATION, COUNTERACT and SECUR-ED completed, the amount of information 
gathered should allow for good quality semi-quantitative analysis. Further through the application of the FAIR 
methodology, the project SECUREMETRO demonstrated that risk can be quantified in economic terms. The decision to 
use qualitative or quantitative values should be driven by the needs and desires of those who will receive or base their 
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decisions on the analysis results. The presence of the cost benefit analysis requires fully quantitative risk assessment 
approach.
7.2. Detail (depth of data/information levels disaggregation)
The RAMPART methodology is designed to cover risk down to asset and passenger levels. Even if asset value is taken 
into account, overall risk accounts for impact on lives. As such it captures data such as passenger numbers for a station on
an hourly level. 
7.3. Scope (e.g. what threats/assets/Impact Category/sector covered?)
Considering research carried out under EC projects, particularly the SECUREMETRO Project, four types of terrorist 
attacks are included. They represent the majority (over 90%) of potential threats to which metro and light rail systems are 
exposed. The threats considered include explosives, CBRN, sabotage and cyber-attacks (Armed attack and Unarmed
attack).
7.4. What is target user group (legislators, management, technocrats, etc.)
RAMPART is best suited for application at company level, providing high level of detail. The targeted user groups 
include security department, rail operations mangers and management (decision makers). 
7.5. Definition of asset criticality (physical assets, economical, operations, lives, etc.)
Determining the level of asset criticality plays a pivotal role in prioritising efforts for countermeasures and budget 
allocation. Through the project, a study was conducted to develop an inventory of vulnerable assets in the event of a 
terrorist attack (Matsika and O’Neill, 2015b). Further, the most critical assets were determined.  From the literature, past 
terrorist attacks, semi-structured interviews with operators and observational studies, the following clusters of assets were 
identified as being exposed, and therefore vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
x Moveable assets (Metro Vehicles and Light Rail vehicles)
x Fixed (non-moveable) assets (Stations, Rail track, Systems and Peripheral infrastructure around)
The criticality of an asset can be determined in terms of one or combination of the following:
x Immediate direct economic value of asset?
x Spiral indirect effect on other activities (e.g. train operations, other linked business activities, etc.)
x Safety (injuries and loss of life)
In this project, a combination approach was applied. From the moveable assets, the ones considered to be most critical 
are: Railway vehicle interior; Electrical installations and Driver. Critical non-moveable assets were identified as Passenger 
waiting areas; Boarding platform; Operations/security control centre; Concrete sub layer; Tunnel structure; Signaling and 
Switches and Electrical supply.
7.6. Degree of (human) subjectivity in whole RA process
Although it applies a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis, the model leans heavily towards quantitative 
analysis. Inevitably, however, the senior management should determine their levels of tolerance for each of the identified 
assets. Overall, the model minimises human subjectivity, thereby increasing the accuracy and repeatability of the model 
outcomes. 
7.7. Inclusion of Resilience (Integration of countermeasures)
A risk assessment tool has enhanced usefulness if it integrates the ability to quickly bounce back after a successful 
attack, and also provide measures that make it harder for a successful attack. In the event that the attack is successful, the 
measures should result it minimal impact. 
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7.8. Interdependences included (system and/or sectoral)
With the application of the RAMPAT methodology being specific to metros and light rail, interdependencies incorporated 
mainly cover rail transport network ones. This means links to other transport systems (heavy rail and road) are taken into 
account. With the advent of increasing designs of interchanges, such interdependencies are critical. Today’s interchanges mainly 
integrate heavy rail, metro, light rail and road (bus stations). In Europe, it is also becoming common for the interchange to be an 
integral part of a shopping mall.
7.9. Common taxonomy/terminology
Taxonomy adopted in this methodology applies that from the FAIR and RAND methodologies, with addition to cover the 
uniqueness of the RAMPART methodology. 
8. Conclusion
A review of existing national and regional policy frameworks for Canada, EU and USA, together with associated national and 
sectoral risk assessment methodologies has been conducted. Specific to metro and light rail applications, RAMPART Project risk
assessment specifications have been developed. They constitute nine factors and parameters: qualitative vs quantitative approach; 
detail (depth of data/information levels disaggregation); scope (e.g. what threats/assets/sector covered?); what is target user group 
(legislators, management, technocrats, etc); definition of asset criticality; degree of (human) subjectivity in whole RA process; is
resilience included? (are countermeasures integrated); are interdependences included (system or sectoral?); and common 
taxonomy/terminology.
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